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{ where ignorance is bliss, 'Tis folly to be wise.
Thomas Gray, Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College
1 Introduction
According to Che and Sakovics (2008), \hold-up arises when part of the return on
an agent's relationship-specic investments is ex post expropriable by his trading
partner." With an incomplete contract, which arises due to causes such as unforeseen
contingencies and the inability of enforcement, relationship-specic investments are
distorted by the hold-up problem and are therefore insucient.
In the current literature on hold-up, the parties end up with non-trade payos
(outside option) if ex post negotiation breaks down. However, the real world is lled
with stories of \destruction" { behavior that harms both parties so that they are
worse o than in the outside option if ex post negotiation breaks down. An example
can be found in Sobel (2005): recently red employees engaging in sabotage such
as ruining computer systems before they leave their oces. This type of destructive
behavior is costly for both the employers and the employees.
Our main question of inquiry is: if there exists an option of \destruction," will
the ineciency of underinvestment caused by hold-up be alleviated? We construct a
simple hold-up game in the following context: (1) only one party (the supplier) invests
ex ante; (2) the other party (the buyer) makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer during the
ex post negotiation; (3) the supplier has the option of \destruction" if the ex post
negotiation breaks down.
If the supplier is \selsh," who maximizes her own ex post payo, the option
of ex post destruction does not eliminate the ineciency of the hold-up problem.
Obviously, as destruction is costly for the supplier, the \selsh" supplier will never
destruct. If, instead, the supplier is \spiteful," who will reject an oer below some
threshold and engage in some \destruction" behavior,1 then the buyer may have an
incentive to propose an oer greater than or equal to the threshold value to induce
the supplier to invest ex ante.
We show that with the \spiteful" supplier, under complete information, only if
the supplier's spitefulness is suciently high (the threshold value is greater than or
equal to the ex ante investment cost), will the supplier have the incentive to invest
ex ante. In this case, the option of ex post destruction is irrelevant because no oer
from the buyer to the supplier is below the threshold.
In contrast, in the case of symmetric incomplete information, i.e., both the
supplier and the buyer are uninformed about the spitefulness of the supplier, only if
1In this sense, the threshold represents the spitefulness of the supplier. The higher the threshold,
the more spiteful the supplier.
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the prior belief of the supplier's spitefulness is suciently strong, will the supplier
have the incentive to invest ex ante. In this case, the option of ex post destruction will
enhance the likelihood of ex ante investment, simply because, with the \destruction"
option, the buyer is willing to oer more to the supplier ex post, to avoid possible
\destruction" by the supplier. In this sense, the possibility of \destruction" may
become an incentive to enhance eciency in bilateral relationships with hold-up.
Further, in the case of asymmetric incomplete information, i.e., the supplier
knows her own spitefulness while the buyer does not, we will have the similar result as
in the symmetric incomplete information case. Only if the prior belief of the supplier's
spitefulness is suciently strong, will the supplier have the incentive to invest ex ante.
However, in this case, the option of ex post destruction is irrelevant. Intuitively, since
the supplier is informed, she will not invest ex ante if her own spitefulness value is
greater than the anticipated ex post oer from the buyer. Therefore, even with the
option of \destruction" ex post, there is no \destruction" at all at the equilibrium
and thus the stimulation from the option of \destruction" is also absent.2
Third, if the buyer does not know whether or not the supplier is informed, the
supplier may have an incentive to pretend to be uninformed even if she is informed.
If the buyer believes that the supplier is also uninformed, the buyer will bargain less
aggressively and oer more if the \destruction" option exists as in the symmetric
incomplete information case.
In summary, the option of ex post destruction is not sucient to enhance ex ante
eciency. Only if the information is \coarse" enough about the spitefulness of the
supplier, more specically if the buyer is uninformed and believes that the supplier
is also uninformed, will the option of ex post destruction alleviate the ineciency
of underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem.3 Indeed, lack of knowledge may
result in happiness. Sometimes it is benecial not to know something. It is more
advantageous for you to make a threat if you are uninformed. If your opponent
believes this, your threat becomes more convincing.
Our paper is related to Ng (2011), which proposes that the ex post ability to
destroy the relationship-specic investment can solve the hold-up problem. However,
in Ng (2011), there is no distinction between the payos following \destruction" and
non-trade if negotiation breaks down. We point out that destruction must be some
behavior harming both parties so that if ex post negotiation breaks down, they will
be worse o than in the outside option. In particular, destruction must be costly
for the party who destructs. In other words, when the supplier \destructs," not only
the buyer but also the supplier suers payo losses. That is, when destructing, the
2The notion of equilibrium we use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
3There are some studies that compare games with and without added punishment schemes. For
example, Fehr and Gachter (2000) report the empirical evidence that prospects of cooperation are
greatly improved if there exists an option to punish defectors, even though punishment is costly for
the punishers in a one-shot context.
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supplier punishes the buyer at the supplier's own cost, as assumed below.4
Assumption 1 Suppose if negotiation breaks down, the non-trade payos for the
supplier and the buyer are (a; b). Then, if the supplier engages in some \destruction"
behavior, the payos for the supplier and the buyer will be (a   X; b   Y ), where
X > 0; Y > 0.
Our paper is also related to the literature of behavioral game theory, which sug-
gests that fairness (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger 2004) may aect ineciency of the hold-up problem. For example, Dufwen-
berg, Smith, and Van Essen (2013) argue that vengeance (negative reciprocity) may
alleviate the ineciency caused by the hold-up problem, provided that the investor
holds the residual rights of control if ex post negotiation breaks down.5 von Siemens
(2009) investigates a model of private information in which the seller knows her own
type as either \selsh" or \fair-minded." Therefore the seller's investment plays a role
of signalling that entails incentives for investment.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the case where
the the supplier is \selsh." Section 3 investigates the case where the supplier is
\spiteful." The model is extended further to investigate the case with incomplete
information in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 \Selsh" Supplier
Consider a trading relationship between a buyer and a supplier, who are both risk
neutral. At date 0, the supplier decides whether or not to make an investment that
costs her c > 0. Investment (I) enables her to split a pie of size y with the buyer in
the subsequent period. Assume there is no discounting and it is socially ecient to
invest, i.e., c < y. If the supplier does not make the investment (O), they both get
nothing.
4The eciency result in Ng (2011) is crucially rooted on the assumption that if the supplier
is indierent between destructing and not destructing, she will destruct. Here, with the costly
destruction as assumed in assumption 1, the possibility of tie-breaking is ruled out and thus there
is no room of the tie-breaking rule as specied in Ng (2011).
5In Dufwenberg, Smith, and Van Essen (2013), the residual value for the investor (player 1) is
normalized to zero, while the residual value for the opponent (player 2) is (1 )v2, where  2 [0; 1].
If ex post negotiation breaks down, player 1 punishes player 2 at player 1's own cost by forgoing the
\consolation payo" t, which is less than the residual value.
6In our model, the investment from the supplier (the seller in von Siemens' setting) is binary.
Therefore, there is no role of signaling as in von Siemens (2009). Further, von Siemens (2009)
assumes behavioral costs for the \fair-minded" seller if she accepts the unfair oer below some
threshold. In contrast, we focus on the option of ex post destruction, in which the supplier rejects
an oer below some threshold and engage in some \destruction" behavior to punish the buyer at
the supplier's own cost.
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If at date 0 the supplier invests, at date 1 the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oer, p  0. Then at the following date 2 the supplier has two options: to accept the
oer (A), or to reject the oer (R). If the supplier accepts the oer, they will split
the pie according to the oer and the game ends. Rejecting an oer ends the game
and they will stay with their own non-trade payos, which are normalized to zero.
The game tree is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1.
Supplier
O
0,0
Buyer
p
R
-c,0
Supplier
A
p-c, y-p
I
Supplier
O
0,0
Buyer
p
R
Supplier
A D
p-c, y-p -c-X, -Y
I
-c,0
y-py-p
Supplier
O
0,0
Buyer
y
R
-c,0
Supplier
A D
p-c, y-p -c-X, -Y
I
Figure 1: Game tree without and with the \destruction" option
Suppose now the supplier has the third option: instead of accepting the oer (A) or
rejecting the oer (R), the supplier could engage in some \destruction" behavior (D).
If the supplier does so, the payos for the supplier and the buyer will be ( X; Y )
on top of their non-trade payos, wh e X > 0; Y > 0, as assumed in Assumption
1. The game tree with the \destruction" option is illustrated in the right panel of
Figure 1.
The following proposition shows that if the supplier is \selsh," who maximizes
her own ex post payo, the option of ex post destruction does not eliminate the
ineciency of the hold-up problem.
Proposition 1 For the \selsh" supplier, \destruction" (D) is strictly dominated by
rejecting the oer (R) in the subgame following buyer's oer.
As X > 0,  c >  c X. The \selsh" supplier will never destruct. Anticipating
this, the buyer will only oer the minimum amount to the supplier.7 Backward to
the beginning of the game, as long as the oer is less than the cost of the investment,
there is no incentive for the \selsh" supplier to invest ex ante. The following result
summarizes the ineciency with the \selsh" supplier.
Result 1 With the \selsh" supplier, ex ante there is no investment.
7As pointed out by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), if there is a smallest money unit , then the buyer
may oer p =  to the supplier ex post, other than p = 0 in the continuous case.
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3 \Spiteful" Supplier
Suppose now the supplier is \spiteful," who will reject an oer below some threshold
T 2 [0; y] and engage in some \destruction" behavior to punish the buyer at the
supplier's own cost, if the option of \destruction" exists.8 The game trees without
and with the \destruction" option for the \spiteful" supplier are illustrated in Figure
2.
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Figure 2: Game tree for the \spiteful" supplier
without and with the \destruction" option
Now consider the case with complete information: both the supplier and the buyer
know the spitefulness of the supplier. The following proposition shows that only if
the supplier's spitefulness is suciently high (the threshold value is greater than or
equal to the ex ante investment cost), will the supplier have the incentive to invest
ex ante. In this case, the option of ex post destruction is irrelevant.
Proposition 2 With the \spiteful" supplier, under complete information, if T 
c, we have a unique equilibrium, in which the supplier invests at date 0 and the
buyer oers p = T at date 1; if T < c, we have a unique equilibrium, in which the
supplier does not invest at date 0. These hold for both the cases without and with the
\destruction" option.
Intuitively, the existence of the spiteful supplier, who will either \reject" or \de-
struct" if the oer is less than T , enables the supplier to threaten the buyer not to
fully exploit her ex post. Therefore, the buyer has an incentive to propose an oer
p = T ex post.9 Back to the beginning of the game, as long as, T  c, the supplier
has the incentive to invest ex ante. In this case, the option of ex post destruction
is irrelevant because no oer is less than T . The underinvestment caused by the
8If T = 0, then the supplier becomes \selsh" as in the previous section.
9p > T is not necessary, as p = T is sucient to induce the supplier to \accept" the oer.
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hold-up problem is only partially solved, as there is no investment ex ante if T < c.
The following result summarizes the ineciency with the \spiteful" supplier under
complete information.10
Result 2 With the \spiteful" supplier, under complete information, only if the spite-
fulness of the supplier is suciently high, will the supplier have the incentive to invest
ex ante.
4 Incomplete Information
Now consider the case with incomplete information. Suppose the prior belief about
the spitefulness of the supplier follows some distribution. Following Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), assume a fraction s of suppliers are \selsh" with T = 0, while the remaining
fraction 1   s of suppliers are \spiteful" to various degrees T 2 (k; y), which follows
some continuous distribution: T  F , with the density f , where k 2 (0; y). In
addition, assume the density function f decreases in T to capture the idea that the
supplier is less likely to be strongly \spiteful."11
There are two scenarios: (1) symmetric incomplete information, in which both
the supplier and the buyer are uninformed about the spitefulness of the supplier; (2)
asymmetric incomplete information, in which the supplier knows her own spitefulness,
while the buyer does not.
4.1 Symmetric Incomplete Information
Under symmetric incomplete information, both the supplier and the buyer are un-
informed. Their decision will be based on the prior belief. First, consider the case
without the \destruction" option. Given the supplier invests at date 0, at date 1 if
10An example is found in Mario Puzo's classic novel The Godfather. The Bocchicchio Family
serves the role of \the hostages" prior to meetings between the heads of the families. In Book Five,
Chapter 20, this is described in details.
The Bocchicchio Family was unique in that, once a particularly ferocious branch of
the Maa in Sicily, it had become an instrument of peace in America. ... the Boc-
chicchio Family became negotiators and hostages in the peace eorts of warring Maa
families. ... A strain of stupidity ran through the Bocchicchio clan, or perhaps they
were just primitive. ... They had only two assets. Their honor and their ferocity. ...
a Bocchicchio never forgot an injury and never left it unavenged no matter what the
cost.
11In reality, from the supplier's point of view, the \fair" ex post oer from the buyer has to at
least cover the ex ante investment cost. An example of the distribution is the beta distribution:
Beta(1; ) with the support (c; y), where  > 1.
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the buyer oers p, only the supplier with T  p will accept the oer. The supplier
with T > p will reject the oer.12 The buyer's problem at date 1 is as follows.
max
p
s(y   p) + (1  s)
Z p
0
(y   p)f(T )dT
The rst order condition is
 s+ (1  s)[ F (p) + (y   p)f(p)] = 0 (1)
Suppose p satises the rst order condition above.
In contrast, with the \destruction" option, given the supplier invests at date 0, at
date 1 if the buyer oers p, only the supplier with T  p will accept the oer. The
supplier with T > p will reject the oer and engage in some \destruction" behavior.
The buyer's problem at date 1 is as follows.
max
p
s(y   p) + (1  s)
Z p
0
(y   p)f(T )dT +
Z y
p
 Y f(T )dT

The rst order condition is
 s+ (1  s)[ F (p) + (y   p+ Y )f(p)] = 0 (2)
Suppose p satises the rst order condition above.
The following lemma shows that with the \destruction" option the buyer is willing
to oer more to the supplier ex post, to avoid possible \destruction" by the supplier.
Lemma 1
p  p
Proof. See Appendix.
The following proposition shows that under symmetric incomplete information,
only if the prior belief of the supplier's spitefulness is suciently strong, will the
supplier have the incentive to invest ex ante. In this case, the option of ex post
destruction will enhance the likelihood of ex ante investment. Simply because, with
the \destruction" option, the buyer is willing to oer more to the supplier ex post,
to avoid possible \destruction" by the supplier. In this sense, the possibility of \de-
struction" may become an incentive to enhance eciency in bilateral relationships
with hold-up.
12Assume, once the buyer makes the take-it-or-leave-it oer, the spitefulness of the supplier will
be realized and the supplier will make decision based on her true spitefulness, even though she is
uninformed ex ante. This says that one will get to know one's true self in the crucial moment
eventually.
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Proposition 3 With the \spiteful" supplier, under symmetric incomplete informa-
tion, we have two scenarios.
Without the \destruction" option: if p  c, we have a unique equilibrium, in
which the supplier invests at date 0 and the buyer oers p = p at date 1; if
p < c, we have a unique equilibrium, in which the supplier does not invest at
date 0, where p is from equation 1.
With the \destruction" option: if p  c, we have a unique equilibrium, in
which the supplier invests at date 0 and the buyer oers p = p at date 1;
if p < c, we have a unique equilibrium, in which the supplier does not invest
at date 0, where p is from equation 2.
Intuitively, under symmetric incomplete information, based on the prior belief, at
date 1 the buyer oers p (or p) from equation 1 (or equation 2) without (or with)
the \destruction" option. Back to the beginning of the game, as long as, p (or p)
 c, the supplier has the incentive to invest ex ante. Since p  p from lemma
1, the option of ex post destruction enhances the likelihood of ex ante investment.
Still, the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem is only partially solved, as
there is no investment ex ante if p (or p) is less than c. Further, beyond the ex
ante ineciency, we could have ex post ineciency. If the realization of the supplier's
spitefulness T > p (or p), the supplier will reject the oer and engage the in some
\destruction" behavior. The following result summarizes the ineciency with the
\spiteful" supplier under symmetric incomplete information.
Result 3 With the \spiteful" supplier, under symmetric incomplete information,
only if the prior belief of the supplier's spitefulness is suciently strong, will the
supplier have the incentive to invest ex ante. The option of ex post destruction en-
hances the likelihood of ex ante investment. Furthermore, we could end up with ex
post ineciency, if the realization of the supplier's spitefulness is suciently high.
4.2 Asymmetric Incomplete Information
Under asymmetric incomplete information, only the supplier knows her own spiteful-
ness, while the buyer does not. And the buyer knows that the supplier knows her
own spitefulness. The following proposition shows that under asymmetric incomplete
information, we have the similar result as in the symmetric incomplete information
case. Only if the prior belief of the supplier's spitefulness is suciently strong, will
the supplier have the incentive to invest ex ante. However, in this case, the option of
ex post destruction is irrelevant.
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Proposition 4 With the \spiteful" supplier, under asymmetric incomplete informa-
tion, if p  c, we have a unique equilibrium, in which the supplier with T  p
invests at date 0 and the buyer oers p = p at date 1; if p < c, we have a unique
equilibrium, in which the supplier does not invest at date 0, where p is from equation
1. These hold for both the cases without and with the \destruction" option.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, under asymmetric incomplete information, the supplier will not invest
ex ante if her own spitefulness value is greater than the anticipated ex post oer from
the buyer at date 1. Therefore, even with the option of \destruction" ex post, there
is no \destruction" at all at the equilibrium. Based on the prior belief, at date 1 the
buyer oers p from equation 1. Back to the beginning of the game, as long as, p  c,
the supplier with T  p has the incentive to invest ex ante. Still, the underinvestment
caused by the hold-up problem is only partially solved, as there is no investment ex
ante if p < c. Contrary to the symmetric incomplete information case, there is no ex
post ineciency, as there is no \destruction" at all at the equilibrium. Meanwhile,
the stimulation from the option of \destruction" is also absent. The following result
summarizes the ineciency with the \spiteful" supplier under asymmetric incomplete
information.
Result 4 With the \spiteful" supplier, under asymmetric incomplete information,
only if the prior belief of the supplier's spitefulness is suciently strong, will the
supplier have the incentive to invest ex ante. The option of ex post destruction is
irrelevant.
4.3 Asymmetric Incomplete Information { A Variation
Consider a variation from the asymmetric incomplete information in the previous
section. Let's still assume that only the supplier knows her own spitefulness, while
the buyer does not. However, now assume that the buyer does not know that the
supplier knows her own spitefulness and the buyer believes that the supplier is also
uninformed.
Therefore, we are back to the symmetric incomplete information case. Based on
the prior belief, at date 1 the buyer oers p (or p) from equation 1 (or equation
2) without (or with) the \destruction" option. Since p  p from lemma 1, the
option of ex post destruction enhances the likelihood of ex ante investment. Still,
the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem is only partially solved, as there
is no investment ex ante if p (or p) < c. However, contrary to the symmetric
incomplete information case, there is no ex post ineciency, as the supplier knows
her own spitefulness. If the spitefulness of the supplier T > p (or p), the anticipated
ex post oer from the buyer at date 1, the supplier will not invest ex ante. Therefore,
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even with the option of \destruction" ex post, there is no \destruction" at all at
the equilibrium. The following result summarizes the ineciency with the \spiteful"
supplier under the variation of the asymmetric incomplete information.
Result 5 With the \spiteful" supplier, under the variation of the asymmetric incom-
plete information, only if the prior belief of the supplier's spitefulness is suciently
strong, will the supplier have the incentive to invest ex ante. The option of ex post
destruction enhances the likelihood of ex ante investment. However, there is no ex
post ineciency.
Intuitively, if the buyer does not know whether or not the supplier is informed, the
supplier may have an incentive to pretend to be uninformed even if she is informed.
If the buyer believes that the supplier is also uninformed, the buyer will bargain less
aggressively and oer more if the \destruction" option exists as in the symmetric
incomplete information case.
5 Concluding Remarks
We investigate whether or not ex post destruction can solve the hold-up problem.
We construct a simple hold-up game and show that the option of ex post destruction
is not sucient to enhance ex ante eciency. In particular, only if the information
about the spitefulness of the supplier is coarse enough, more specically if the buyer
is uninformed and believes that the supplier is also uninformed, will the option of ex
post destruction alleviate the ineciency of underinvestment caused by the hold-up
problem.
The major conclusion is that sometimes it is benecial not to know something.
It is more advantageous for you to make a threat if you are uninformed. If your
opponent believes this, your threat becomes more convincing. If, instead, you get
informed and your opponent knows that you know your own true type, you may not
have the courage or resolution to run the risks of investing in a potentially protable
project. However, if your opponent does not know whether or not you are informed,
you may have the incentive to pretend to be blurred.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Take the derivative with respect to Y on both sides of equation 2.
 dF (p)
dp
dp
dY
+

  dp
dY
+ 1

f(p) + (y   p+ Y ) df(p)
dp
dp
dY
= 0
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where dF (p)dp = f(p). Rearrange and we have
dp
dY
=
f(p)
2f(p)  (y   p+ Y ) df(p)dp
Since f(p)  0 and df(p)dp  0 as assumed, we have dp=dY  0. Y > 0 implies p  p from
equation 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the case with the \destruction" option. Given the supplier invests at date 0,
at date 1 if the buyer oers ep, only the supplier with T  ep will accept the oer. As the
supplier is informed about the spitefulness of herself ex ante, she will not invest at date 0
if T > ep. Therefore, the buyer's problem at date 1 is as follows.
maxep s(y   ep) + (1  s)
Z ep
0
(y   ep)f(T )dT
Note, the buyer's problem remains the same for both the cases without and with the \de-
struction" option, as the supplier will not invest ex ante if her own spitefulness value is
greater than the anticipated ex post oer from the buyer at date 1. Therefore, even with
the option of \destruction" ex post, there is no \destruction" at all at the equilibrium.
Solving the optimization problem above, we have the rst order condition same as
equation 1 and subsequently the same solution p. Therefore, if p  c, we have a unique
equilibrium, in which the supplier with T  p invests at date 0 and the buyer oers p = p
at date 1. If, instead, p < c, the anticipated ex post oer from the buyer at date 1 does
not cover the cost of investment, the supplier will not invest at date 0.
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